In this paper we present a new multi-authority secret-ballot election scheme that guarantees privacy, universal veri ability, and robustness. It is the rst scheme for which the performance is optimal in the sense that time and communication complexity is minimal both for the individual voters and the authorities. An interesting property of the scheme is that the time and communication complexity for the voter is independent of the number of authorities. A voter simply posts a single encrypted message accompanied by a compact proof that it contains a valid vote. Our result is complementary to the result by Cramer, Franklin, Schoenmakers, and Yung in the sense that in their scheme the work for voters is linear in the number of authorities but can be instantiated to yield information-theoretic privacy, while in our scheme the voter's e ort is independent of the number of authorities but always provides computational privacy-protection. We will also point out that the majority of proposed voting schemes provide computational privacy only (often without even considering the lack of information-theoretic privacy), and that our new scheme is by far superior to those schemes.
Introduction
In the cryptographic literature, electronic voting protocols are known as the prime examples of secure multi-party computations. Many papers have been written on the subject and by now an extensive list of properties and requirements is generally accepted as desirable. We will consider these properties in this paper, among which are privacy, universal veri ability, and various forms of robustness. Recent advancements have also been particularly concerned with the performance aspect. In this paper we will show under which circumstances it is possible to achieve a scheme with optimal performance for large-scale elections, while at the same time keeping the system simple and provably secure.
In considering the performance of elections it is clear that the main consideration should be the e ort required of a voter. Indeed, while governments can (and do nowadays) a ord a large organizational e ort to hold elections, it is mandatory to make the voting protocol as simple and e cient as possible for the voter|who might be participating from home using a PC or a Web TV. In this paper we present a simple multi-authority election scheme in which the task of the voter is reduced to the bare minimum. Basically, the voter posts a single encrypted message (ballot) accompanied with a proof that it contains a valid vote. For security parameter k, the size of the ballot as well as of its proof of validity is O(k) bits. Moreover, due to the homomorphic properties of the encryption method used, the nal tally is veri able to any observer of the election, while due to the use of a matching fault-tolerant threshold decryption technique, the individual votes will remain private and the (benign or malign) failure of authorities can be tolerated.
We work in the model set forth by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87] , where the active parties are divided into l voters V 1 ; : : :; V l and n tallying authorities (talliers) A 1 ; : : :; A n . To achieve universal veri ability all parties have access to a so-called bulletin board. A bulletin board is like a broadcast channel with memory to the extent that any party (including passive observers) can see the contents of it, and furthermore that each active participant can post messages by appending the message to her own designated area. No party can erase anything from the bulletin board. In this model, voters cast their votes by posting ballots to the bulletin board. The ballot does not reveal any information on the vote itself but it is ensured by an accompanying proof that the ballot indeed contains a valid vote and nothing else. Due to a homomorphic property of the ballots, the nal tally (\sum" of all votes) can be obtained and veri ed (by any observer) against the \product" of all submitted ballots. This ensures universal veri ability.
Properties for elections
Let us state and discuss the properties of elections considered in this paper. For our model, the rst property below (eligibility) will follow directly from the fact that we assume the availability of a bulletin board. The other properties, except for the last one, are achieved by means of cryptographic protocols as proposed in this paper.
Eligibility means that only eligible voters can cast a vote, and that each eligible voter can cast a single vote.
Universal Veri ability ensures that any party, including a passive observer, can check that the election is fair, i.e., that the published nal tally is consistent with the correctly cast ballots. This property also includes that any party can check whether ballots are correctly cast, and that only invalid ballots are discarded.
Privacy of an individual vote is assured against any reasonably sized coalition of parties (not including the voter herself). That is, unless the number of colluding parties exceeds a certain threshold, di erent ballots are indistinguishable irrespective of the contained votes. We say that information-theoretic privacy is achieved when the ballots are indistinguishable independent of any cryptographic assumption; otherwise we will say that computational privacy is achieved.
Robustness means that the faulty behaviour (either benign or malicious) of any reasonably sized coalition of participants can be tolerated. In large-scale elections this includes that no coalition of voters of any size can disrupt the election; in other words, any cheating voter can be detected and discarded.
No vote duplication means that it should be impossible to copy another voter's vote (even without knowing what the copied vote is).
No interaction between voters. For a large-scale election it is unreasonable to require that the voters should all interact with each other as part of the voting protocol.
Receipt-freeness (or non-coercibility) is treated in Section 1.4.
Although we are emphasizing the application of our scheme to large-scale elections, it is also suitable for small-scale elections such as boardroom elections. In the latter case it is even conceivable that each voter plays the role of tallying authority as well; a PC network will su ce as computing platform.
Computational versus information-theoretic privacy
By far, the majority of election protocols that support some level of veri ability (either universal or limited to voters, who can check their own vote) merely provide computational protection of the voter's privacy. For example, the schemes presented by Benaloh et al. CF85, BY86, Ben87, BT94] all rely on the so-called r-th residuosity assumption. Once this assumption is broken (e.g., when the public modulus is factorized), the content of each individual ballot can be decrypted. Similarly, schemes using anonymous channels or mixes Cha81] usually rely on computational assumptions. By recovering the private keys of the mixes, an adversary is able to \open" all ballots posted to the rst mix. For example, the scheme of SK95] relies on the di culty of computing discrete logs, both for the secrecy of the mixes' private keys and for the contents of the ballots.
The extent to which the lack of information-theoretic privacy is harmful may be di cult to estimate. For instance, it is hard to predict what happens if fty-year old votes of a U.S. president are published|although breaking the encryption methods for the currently widely used security parameters will probably be much more harmful.
Whither democracy, from a cryptographic standpoint it is necessary to determine the limits for computational and information-theoretic privacy. As an aside we note that the mere use of multiple authorities can be considered a condition as well. Indeed, election protocols have been proposed that try to eliminate this condition, e.g., see PW92], but the methods used still require conditions regarding the channels connecting the participants. Since in our case the bulletin board is implemented from multiple servers anyway, and it is seen as a necessary primitive for achieving universal veri ability, we will not consider eliminating the use of a distributed tallying authority. Yet, to some extent we will take into account that authorities may be compromised over time, see below.
In this paper we will see how far one can go if computational privacy is the goal. For computational privacy it su ces to assume a public broadcast channel (bulletin board) as communication model. To make an election scheme information-theoretically secure, it is generally believed that private channels between voters and authorities are required. In Section 6.1 we will look into this aspect.
Our contributions
The main result of this paper is a fair election scheme in which the complexity of the voter's protocol is linear in the security parameter k|hence optimal. This comprises the computational as well as the communication complexity (in bits). The voter needs to communicate only O(k) bits and to perform O(k) modular multiplications. 1 Moreover, the dominating 1 Throughout, we will take a modular multiplication of two O(k) sized numbers as our unit of work.
factor for the work of an authority is mk. Compared to the scheme of CFSY96], we thus achieve a reduction of the work for each participant by a factor of n.
In the new scheme, the voter just sends a particular ElGamal encryption of the vote plus a proof that it indeed contains a valid vote. The proof prevents the voters from casting bogus ballots, and should be such that no information whatsoever leaks about the actual vote contained in a ballot. The crux is to keep this proof O(k), and here we follow the approach of CFSY96]. We will need a novel application of the technique of CDS94] for constructing e cient witness hiding protocols. The resulting proof of validity is a little bit more complicated than in CFSY96], but still requires only a few modular exponentiations. A proof of knowledge similar to our proof of validity has been used by Chen and Pedersen to construct e cient group signatures CP95].
Unlike previous schemes based on Benaloh's approach, however, we will achieve robustness w.r.t. faulty authorities without increasing the work for the voter. To this end, we will employ fault-tolerant threshold cryptosystems instead of (veri able) secret sharing schemes. In our case there will be only one public key for which the matching private key is shared among the authorities using threshold cryptography techniques (see Des94] for a survey.) The voter posts the ballot encrypted with the public key of the authorities. The private key is never reconstructed, and only used implicitly when the authorities cooperate to decrypt the nal tally. The correctness of the decryption will be assured, even in the presence of malicious authorities.
Apart from achieving a strong set of properties, three major achievements of our scheme are: (i) The work required of the voter is minimal. Compared to CFSY96] the work is reduced by a multiplicative factor of n. Although n is usually much smaller than k, this is still a substantial gain in practice. The work for the authorities and observers is reduced accordingly.
(ii) The protocol for the voter remains the same even if n is variable. Usually n grows with the desired security of the scheme (the more authorities the less potential that an adversary can corrupt, say, half of them). Using our protocol this growth is \transparent" to the user. This property has very nice applications in simplifying the whole election infrastructure. For example it allows the government to distribute the software for the election protocol once and for all (thus reducing all the problems connected with checking the integrity of such software), while the value of n can be determined a posteriori. (iii) As a bonus, the new scheme can easily be extended using techniques for proactive threshold cryptosystems HJJ + 95] to leave the system (and its keys) in place for a really long time without fearing that the secret key gets compromised (see Section 6.3).
The main scheme presented in the paper is based on the security of the ElGamal encryption scheme (which is related to the di culty of the discret log problem). In Section 5 we describe an alternative construction related to the hardness of factoring.
Coercion
Benaloh and Tuinstra in BT94] introduced the notion of a receipt for electronic election schemes. They showed how previous election protocols all su er from a common defect: a voter can carry away from the protocol a receipt that proves the way he voted. This receipt can then be used for vote buying or for coercion. Several incoercible schemes have been presented since the introduction of the concept (see SK95, NR94, CG96]). We discuss this issue and the relevance of our paper in this context in Section 6.2.
The building blocks 2.1 Bulletin board
The communication model required for our election scheme is best viewed as a public broadcast channel with memory, which is called a bulletin board. All communication through the bulletin board is public and can be read by any party (including passive observers). No party can erase any information from the bulletin board, but each active participant can append messages to its own designated section.
To make the latter requirement publicly veri able, we assume that digital signatures are used to control access to the various sections of the bulletin board. Here we may take advantage of any public-key infrastructure that is already in place. Also note that by postulating that each participant can indeed append messages to its section, it is implicitly assumed that denial-of-service attacks are excluded. This property is realized by designing the bulletin board as a set of replicated servers implementing Byzantine agreement, for instance, such that access is never denied as long as at most a third of the servers is compromised. Reiter's work on the Rampart system shows that this can be done in a secure and practical way (see, e.g., Rei94, Rei95])
ElGamal cryptosystem
Our election scheme relies on the ElGamal cryptosystem DH76, ElG85]. It is well-known that the ElGamal cryptosystem works for any family of groups for which the discrete logarithm is considered intractable.
Our construction works in subgroups G q of order q of Z p , where p and q are large primes such that q j p ? 1. Other practical families can be obtained from elliptic curves over nite elds.
We will now brie y describe the ElGamal cryptosystem, where the primes p and q and at least one generator g of G q are treated as system parameters. These parameters as well as other independent generators introduced in the sequel should be generated jointly by (a designated subset) of the participants. This can be done by letting the participants each run a copy of the same probabilistic algorithm, where the coin ips are generated mutually at random.
The key pair of a receiver in the ElGamal cryptosystem consists of a private key s (randomly chosen by the receiver) and the corresponding public key h = g s , which is announced to the participants in the system. Given a message m 2 G q , encryption proceeds as follows. The sender chooses a random 2 Z q , and sends the pair (x; y) = (g ; h m) as ciphertext to the receiving party. To decrypt the ciphertext (x; y) the receiver recovers the plaintext as m = y=x s , using the private key s.
The security of our scheme rests on the semantic security of the ElGamal cryptosystem.
Robust threshold ElGamal cryptosystem
The object of a threshold scheme for public-key encryption is to share a private key among a set of receivers such that messages can only be decrypted when a substantial set of receivers cooperate. See Des94] for a survey. The main protocols of a threshold system are (i) a key generation protocol to generate the private key jointly by the receivers, and (ii) a decryption protocol to jointly decrypt a ciphertext without explicitly reconstructing the private key. For the ElGamal system described above, solutions for both protocols have been described by Pedersen Ped91, Ped92] , also taking robustness into account.
Key generation As part of the set-up procedure of the election scheme, the authorities will execute a key generation protocol due to Pedersen Ped91] . The result of the key generation protocol is that each authority A j will possess a share s j 2 Z Z q of a secret s. The authorities are committed to these shares as the values h j = g sj are made public. Furthermore, the shares s j are such that the secret s can be reconstructed from any set of t shares using appropriate Lagrange coe cients, say: (1) This is exactly as in Shamir's (t; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme Sha79]. The public key h = g s is announced to all participants in the system. Note that no single participant learns the secret s, and that the value of s is only computationally protected. 2 Decryption To decrypt a ciphertext (x; y) = (g ; h m) without reconstructing the secret s, the authorities execute the following protocol:
1. Each authority A j broadcasts w j = x sj and proves in zero-knowledge that log g h j = log x w j :
2. Let denote any subset of t authorities who passed the zero-knowledge proof. By raising x to both sides of equation (1) Note that step 2 assures that the decryption is correct and successful even if up to n ? t authorities are malicious or fail to execute the protocol. The zero-knowledge proof of step 1 will be described in the next section.
Proofs of knowledge for equality of discrete logs
In this section we will consider several protocols that show equality of discrete logarithms.
Using the same notation as above, we present proofs of knowledge for the relation log g x = log h y, whereby a prover shows possession of an 2 Z Z q satisfying x = g and y = h . An e cient protocol for this problem is due to Chaum and Pedersen CP93], see Figure 1 . This protocol is not known to be zero-knowledge or witness hiding. The following result however su ces for our application (see also CDS94] for de nitions of the notions involved).
Lemma 1 The Chaum-Pedersen protocol is a three-move, public coin proof of knowledge for the relation log g x = log h y. The proof satis es special soundness, and is special honest-veri er zero-knowledge.
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The private channels assumed in Pedersen's key generation protocol may be implemented using public key encryption and the bulletin board. This su ces for computational security. 2
Notice that the above protocol is zero-knowledge only against the honest veri er, but this su ces for our purpose. Indeed, jumping ahead a little, in order to make our protocols noninteractive, the veri er will be implemented using either a trusted source of random bits (a beacon as in Rab83, Ben87]) or using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic FS87] which requires a hash function. In the latter case security is obtained for the random oracle model. If so desired, a perfect zero-knowledge protocol secure against any veri er can be obtained by replacing the challenge space Z Z q with f0; 1g and repeating the basic protocol k times. The drawback is that the complexity of the resulting protocol is O(k 2 ). This protocol is directly related to the protocol for \simultaneous dicrete log" by Chaum, Evertse, and van de Graaf CEG88]. Both protocols, being public-coin ones, can be made non-interactive using the FiatShamir heuristic. Alternatively, there is a four-move, O(k) zero-knowledge protocol due to
Chaum Cha91] (see BCDP91] for a proof). This protocol is not public-coin though, which means that it requires interaction.
Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption schemes form an important tool for achieving universally veri able election schemes. A general de nition of the notion is as follows. Let E denote a probabilistic encryption scheme. Let M be the message space and C the ciphertext space such that M is a group under operation and C is a group under operation . We say that E is a ( ; )-homomorphic encryption scheme if for any instance E of the encryption scheme, given For the reasons sketched above however, we need to take this one step further to a homomorphic scheme with addition as group operation for the message space. That is, instead of G q , our message space will be Z Z q with addition modulo q as group operation. Given a xed generator G 2 G q , the encryption of a message m 2 Z Z q will be the ElGamal encryption of G m . The observation is now that, given two such encryptions of m 1 and m 2 , respectively, the product is an encryption of m 1 + m 2 modulo q. Notice that for such a scheme decryption involves the computation of a discrete log, which is a hard task in general. Nevertheless it can be done e ciently for \small" messages, as will be the case in our election scheme (see Section 3). The encryption should be accompanied by a proof of validity that proves that the encryption indeed contains one of these values. Furthermore, the proof should not reveal any information about which one.
E cient proofs of validity
Consider an ElGamal encryption of the following form: (x; y) = (g ; h m); with m 2 fm 0 ; m 1 g; where the prover knows the value of m. To show that the pair (x; y) is indeed of this form without revealing the value of m boils down to a witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge of the relation given by: log g x = log h (y=m 0 ) _ log g x = log h (y=m 1 ):
The prover either knows a witness for the left part or a witness for the right part (but not both at the same time), depending on the choice for m.
By the techniques of CDS94], we can now immediately obtain a very e cient witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge for the above relation. To prove either of the two equalities we have the e cient proof of knowledge by Chaum and Pedersen, described above, for which we have prepared Lemma 1. On account of this lemma, we have that the protocol exactly satis es the conditions for the construction of CDS94]. See Figure 2 for a preview of the protocol, as it is used in the election scheme of the next section.
3 Multi-authority election scheme Given the primitives of the previous section we now assemble a simple and e cient election scheme. The participants in the election protocol are n authorities A 1 ; : : :; A n and l voters V 1 ; : : :; V l . Recall that the requirements for a ballot are that it must contain a vote in an unambiguous way such that (i) votes accumulate when ballots are aggregated, and (ii) the proof of validity shows that a ballot contains either a yes-vote or a no-vote, without revealing any information on which of the two is the case.
To show that the same masking technique as in SK94, CFSY96] can be used, we instantiate the scheme of Section 2.6 with m 1 = G and m 0 = 1=G, where G is a xed generator of G q . Thus a ballot is prepared as an ElGamal encryption of the form (x; y) = (g ; h G b ) for random b 2 R f1; ?1g, and the corresponding proof of knowledge is depicted in Figure 2 .
In order to make vote casting non-interactive two approaches can be taken. One is to assume the presence of a trusted beacon that broadcasts random bits at regular intervals. In this case the challenge c can be taken from the bits sent by the beacon when the voter posts her vote (assuming that there is a mechanism that assigns unique slots to voters). A practical way to implement a beacon is the standard use of a suitable hash function H to compute the challenge c from the rst message of the proof. In this case security is retained in the random oracle model, but some care is required to prevent vote duplication. Each challenge must be made voter-speci c (see Gen95]), i.e., the challenge c is computed by voter V i as H(ID i ; x; y; a 1 ; b 1 ; a 2 ; b 2 ), where ID i is a unique public string identifying V i .
To cast a ballot the voter posts an additional number e 2 f1; ?1g such that v = be is equal to the desired vote. Alternatively, voters may adapt the precomputed values before sending the ballot out, i.e., precompute (x; y) and then post (x e ; y e ). As part of the initialization the designated parties generate the system parameters p; q; g; G, as described in Section 2.2, where we may safely assume that l < q=2 for any reasonable security parameter k. Secondly, the authorities execute the robust key generation protocol as described in Section 2.3. The transcripts of these protocol should appear on the bulletin board. Note that this also shows to any observer that indeed n authorities are taken part in the scheme, which is otherwise not visible to the voters. 3 The main steps of the voting protocol now are, where we assume w.l.o.g. that only correct ballots are cast:
1. Voter V i posts a ballot (x i ; y i ) to the bulletin board accompanied by a non-interactive proof of validity. 2. When the deadline is reached, the proofs of validity are checked by the authorities and the product (X; Y ) = ( Q l i=1 x i ; Q l i=1 y i ) is formed.
3. Finally, the authorities jointly execute the decryption protocol of Section 2.3 for (X; Y ) to obtain the value of W = Y=X s . A non-interactive proof of knowledge is used in
Step 1 of the decryption protocol.
We thus get W = G T as a result, where T is equal to the di erence between the number of yes-votes and no-votes, ?l T l. Hence, T = log G W which is in general hard to compute. However, in our case we can now fully exploit the fact that the number of voters l is relatively small|certainly polynomial in the security parameter! The value of T can be determined easily using O(l) modular multiplications only, by iteratively generating G ?l ; G ?l+1 ; G ?l+2 ; : : : (each time using one multiplication) until W is found. Asymptotically, the work does therefore not increase for the authorities (at most two multiplications per voter). Note also that the computation of log G W may be done by any party because the result is veri able. 4 The time and communication complexity of the scheme is as follows. The work for a voter is clearly linear in k, independent of the number of authorities. The work for the authorities is only O(lk + nk) (assuming that the zero-knowledge proof used in step 3 is O(k), hence negligible). Since we may safely assume that the number of voters is larger than the number of authorities, the work for the authorities is actually O(lk). Similarly, the work for an observer who wants to check the outcome of the election is O(lk).
We summarize our result in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 If the ElGamal cryptosystem is semantically secure, then our election scheme provides universal veri ability, computational privacy, robustness, and prevents vote duplication.
Proof Universal veri ability is achieved because any observer can check the proofs of validity for the ballots, since those are made non-interactive. It is also clear to any observer if the nal tally is correct with respect to all valid ballots. Privacy of individual votes is guaranteed by the security of the ElGamal cryptosystem used to encrypt the votes. This is true because we assume that no more than t?1 authorities conspire, since t authorites can reconstruct the secret key used in the scheme. Besides the encrypted votes a voter casts a proof of validity, but this is useless in order to break the privacy since such proof is witness indistinguishable. Robustness with respect to malicious voters is achieved by means of the soundness of the proof of validity, which ensures that voters cannot submit bogus ballots. Robustness with 3 This is because messages to the bulletin board are authenticated using digital signatures, so it is not possible that a single entity simulates the behavior of n authorities whose public keys are commonly known to the observers. respect to at most n ? t malicious authorities is inherited from the robustness of the key generation and decryption protocols.
Finally, vote duplication is prevented due to the fact that the proofs of validity are made voter-speci c.
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For the non-interactive version of the scheme based on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the result holds in the random oracle model.
Extension to multi-way elections
Instead of o ering a choice between two options, it is often required that a choice between several options can be made. There are numerous approaches to tackle this problem. Below, we sketch an approach fow which the size of the ballots does not increase (but the size of the proof of validity does). To get an election for a 1-out-of-K choice, we simply take K (independently generated) generators G i , 1 i K, and accumulate the votes for each option separately. The proof of validity of a ballot (x; y) now boils down to a proof of knowledge of log g x = log h (y=G 1 ) _ _ log g x = log h (y=G K ): Since the voter can only generate this proof for at most one generator G i , it is automatically guaranteed that the voter cannot vote for more than one option at a time.
The problem of computing the nal tally is in general more To show the generality of our approach we now present a scheme for which the security is related to the di culty of factoring. Speci cally, we present a scheme based on the q-th residuosity assumption (as in the original Benaloh schemes). The notion of q-th residues is an extension of quadratic residues. A number x is a q-th residue modulo N if there exists an such that q = x(mod N). It is believed to be hard to distinguish between q-residues and non q-residues.
This suggests the following homomorphic encryption scheme. We present a speci c implementation which is suitable to threshold cryptography techniques. The parameters of the scheme are a modulus N = PQ, where P = 2P 0 + 1 and Q = 2qQ 0 + 1, with P; Q; P 0 ; Q 0 ; q all large primes. As before, the prime q can thus be assumed to be larger than twice the number Next we discuss a robust threshold cryptosystem for this setting. Notice that the value d = (N)=q could be considered the secret key of the scheme, and that decryption is carried out by simply computing exponentiations (modulo N) with exponent d. As the setting is very similar to an RSA decryption, we can apply the result of GJKR96] to obtain an e cient and robust threshold decryption procedure. The result in GJKR96] holds for RSA moduli which are the product of safe primes (i.e., P = 2P 0 + 1 and Q = 2Q 0 + 1), but it can easily be extended to work for our speci c needs.
The key generation protocol, however, relies on secure multiparty computations as there is no known e cient way to perform a distributed key generation algorithm for factoring based schemes. However, since this task is part of the set-up of the scheme, this may be acceptable as a one-time operation.
Our nal task is to construct an e cient proof of validity that shows that a ballot x is correctly formed. This amounts to showing that x = q Y v , for some , with v 2 f1; ?1g, hence that either x=Y or xY is a q-th residue. As before, Lemma 2 below guarantees the existence of an e cient proof of validity, based on the construction of CDS94].
Lemma 2 The protocol of Figure 3 is a three-move, public coin proof of knowledge for r-th residuosity. The proof satis es special soundness, and is special honest-veri er zeroknowledge.
Proof Completeness of the proof of knowledge is clear. Special soundness holds because for two accepting conversations (a; c; r) and (a; c 0 ; r 0 ), where w.l.o.g. c > c 0 , it follows that (r=r 0 ) q = x c?c 0 . Since 0 < c?c 0 < q we have that there exist integers k; l such that (c?c 0 )k = 1 + lq, hence (r=r 0 ) kq = x lq+1 , which may be rewritten as ((r=r 0 ) k x ?l ) q = x. Honest-veri er zero-knowledge holds because, for random c 2 Z Z q and r 2 Z Z n we have that (r q x ?c ; c; r) is an accepting conversation with the right distribution. Since challenge c can be chosen freely, we also have special honest-veri er zero-knowledge.
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Theorem 2 Under the q-th residuosity assumption, our election scheme provides universal veri ability, computational privacy, robustness, and prevents vote duplication.
6 Discussion 6.1 Information-theoretically secure elections
The scheme of CFSY96] in principle provides information-theoretic protection of the voter's privacy. This is due to the fact that voters post (a number of) information-theoretically hiding commitments to the bulletin board and that these commitments are opened to the authorities using private channels. A general problem with such a solution is that the use of private channels opens the possibility for disputes: on the one hand a dishonest voter may just skip sending a message to an authority, while on the other hand a dishonest authority may claim not to have received a message.
It is therefore worthwhile to limit the possibility for disputes to the set-up process for the election. During the election protocol itself no disputes on the usage of the private channel should be possible. The idea is to use a public broadcast channel (such as a bulletin board) on which the parties post commitments to mutually selected keys. Each pair of parties rst agrees on a key using a secure channel. Only if both parties broadcast the same commitment, the set-up of the private channel succeeded. Otherwise, there is dispute that must be solved at this stage. It is important that (i) the commitment is information-theoretically hiding and (ii) the encryption method is information-theoretically secure (a one-time pad). More concretely, the two phases are as follows:
Set-up Both parties agree on a mutually at random selected key K and a commitment B on this key. Both parties broadcast a signed copy of the commitment. The key set-up is only succesful if both parties broadcast the same commitment. Disputes in this stage have to be resolved in a procedural way.
Communication To send a message m, the sender will broadcast the encryption E K (m) over the public channel. Only the intended receiver is able to recover the message.
Using this method, private channels can be set up from each voter V i to each authority A j . Once set up succeeds there can be no dispute on the use of the private channel. Anybody sees if the voter abstains from posting the required values to the bulletin board. If what the voter submits consists of incorrect shares, the respective authorities open the commitments to the key so that this fact can be veri ed. Note that for the scheme of CFSY96] the use of the private channels is limited to two elements of Z Z q per channel.
Incoercible protocols
Receipt-free or incoercible election scheme that have been proposed so far all rely on some form of physical assumption BT94, NR94, SK95]. The minimal assumption required (as in SK95]) is the existence of a private channel between the voters and the authorities. These schemes allow a voter to lie about the vote cast even if under coercion, but not up to the level that coercer who exactly prescribe which private random bits the voter must use can be withstood. Indeed given the execution of the protocol the voter will be able to create two di erent histories of his computations, both consistent with the execution but corresponding to two di erent votes. All these schemes also require that the authorities are incoercible, or alternatively that voters know which ones have been coerced. Moreover, as pointed out in the previous section, the use of private channels gives rise to disputes. (Another viable approach is to assume that the voters dispose of a tamper-proof encryption box such as a smartcard, but we consider this beyond the scope of this paper.)
Recently, Canetti and Gennaro in CG96] proved that general secure multiparty computation protocols can be made incoercible without the above assumptions, in particular without assuming untappable channels. Their scheme is based on a new type of encryption called deniable encryption introduced in CDNO96] that allows a sender to encrypt a bit b in such a way that the resulting ciphertext can be \explained" as either b or 1 ? b to a coercer. The construction in CG96] works for the general problem of secure multi-party computation; as such it is described in terms of a complete network of communication and the result holds as long as at most half of the players in the network are coerced. For the case of election schemes, the construction of CG96] can be scaled down to the bulletin board model (thus not requiring communication between voters). In this model all voters can withstand coercion provided the coercer is not able to prescribe the random bits of the voters, and at most half of the authorities can be completely coerced. The complexity of the resulting scheme is high (although polynomial), but opens the door to the search for e cient incoercible schemes.
In order to make our election scheme incoercible (without physical assumptions) we would need a deniable encryption scheme which is (i) homomorphic, (ii) suitable to threshold cryptography techniques. An interesting open problem is thus to construct such a scheme.
Proactive Security
The secrecy of the votes is protected against coalitions of up to t ? 1 authorities. In other words, an attacker must recover t shares of the private key in order to be able to decrypt single votes. This is similar to previous protocols in which the vote is (t; n)-shared among the authorities. We note that the use of threshold cryptography instead of secret sharing presents also some advantages in this area. Using proactive security techniques (see HJKY95, HJJ + 95, FGMY96]) it is possible to leave the public key of the system in place for a really long time without fearing it being compromised. Indeed, when using proactive schemes the shares of the private key are periodically \refreshed" so that an attacker is forced to recover t shares in one single period of time that can be as short as a day. Both schemes presented in this paper can be made proactive, the discrete-log based one using the techiniques in HJJ + 95] and the factoring one by adapting the work of FGMY96].
Let us brie y describe how this stronger security aspect can be achieved. For simplicity we will refer just to the discrete log based scheme HJJ + 95]. At each \refreshing" deadline (say every day at midnight), the authorities run the key generation protocol, but now sharing a zero value. The new shares are added to the old shares of the secret key s. The resulting shares still interpolate to s (since the free term of the polynomial is unchanged) but lie on an otherwise di erent polynomial. This implies that old shares are now useless if combined with new ones, and therefore the attacker needs to start collecting shares from scratch.
Concluding remarks
We have shown a very e cient scheme for secure elections based on the discrete log assumption, and a somewhat more complicated scheme based on the q-th residuosity assumption.
The new schemes satisfy all well-known requirements, except for receipt-freeness. An open problem is to construct e cient incoercible election protocols, preferably without relying on physical assumptions.
In our scheme the work for the voter is minimal and independent of the number of authorities. Election schemes based on the mix channel of PIK94] also have this property but for several reasons our approach is preferable over those schemes. In mix-based schemes the nal tally is computed by somehow decrypting the individual ballots, while in our approach a single decryption of the aggregate of the ballots su ces. In mix-based schemes disrupters may submit invalid ballots which are detected only after decryption has taken place; in our scheme disruption by voters is automatically prevented because of the required proof of validity for ballots. Another important di erence is that due to the use of a threshold cryptosystem we achieve robustness in a stronger sense. Indeed in mix-based schemes the failure of a single authority would compromise the whole protocol. In our case we can tolerate malicious behavior of a constant fraction (half) of authorities. Finally, the security of our scheme can be proven from its construction, while some security problems with the schemes of PIK94, SK95] exist, as shown for instance in P 95, MH96].
We would like to emphasize that the work for the voter is really low. For example, for the discrete log scheme, we have for jpj = 64 bytes and jqj = 20 bytes, that the size of the ballot plus its proof plus a signature on it is only 272 bytes in total. Clearly, this is an order of magnitude better than CFSY96], which was already two orders of magnitude better than any previous scheme. Furthermore, computation of the ballot and its proof require a few exponentiations only (see Figure 2) . A direct consequence of the reduced ballot size is also that the task of verifying the nal tally is much simpler.
